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In this paper we analyse contributions to a public good within an inter-generational 
framework where at the end of each session one generation of subjects leave advice 
for the succeeding generation via free form messages. Such advice can be private 
(advice left by one player in generation t is given only to her immediate successor in 
generation  1 t + ) or public (advice left by players of generation t is made available to 
all members of generation  1 t + ). We estimate a panel regression model that enables 
us to understand the dynamics of the process better and to highlight the learning that 
occurs over time. Our estimation results show that contributions in any period depend 
crucially on contributions in the previous period and on the group average in the 
previous period - more specifically whether a subject’s own contribution in the 
previous period fell above or below the group average. We find that in the public 
advice treatment when a subject’s contribution fell below the group average in the 
previous period there is a tendency on the part of that subject to increase contributions 
in the next period.  
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1. Introduction 
There is now a voluminous experimental literature capturing the tension 
between contributing to a public good or free-riding on others’ contribution using a 
voluntary contributions mechanism. See Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984), Isaac, 
McCue and Plott (1985), Isaac and Walker (1988a, 1988b), Kim and Walker (1984) 
and Andreoni (1988, 1990, 1995a, 1995b) for studies describing this phenomenon. 
Ledyard (1995) provides a broad review of much of this literature as well as a 
description of what a typical public goods experiment looks like.TP
1
PT  
Prior experimental work in the area has documented a number of empirical 
regularities. First, while groups of subjects do not manage to reach the socially 
optimal level of contributions, the strong free riding hypothesis of zero contribution is 
clearly refuted since subjects do contribute to the public good. Second, in a one-shot 
version of the public goods game, a group of subjects on average contribute between 
40% and 60% of the optimal level. There are, however, wide variations in individual 
contributions with some players contributing 100% with others contributing 0%. But 
most prior studies find that on average most groups contribute somewhere in the 40%-
60% range. Third, contributions decline steadily with repetition, i.e. if the players 
interact repeatedly over a number of rounds then contributions decline steadily over 
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1
PT Ledyard (1995, p. 112) provides the following description of a generic public goods game. A group 
of four subjects are gathered in a room. They are each given a sum of money (say $5) and they are told 
that they can keep any or all of this amount. Or if they want they can contribute some or all of this 
amount to a public pool. However any amount contributed to a public pool is multiplied by a factor 
greater than 1 (say 2) by the experimenter. This multiplied amount is then distributed equally between 
the four group members. The socially optimal outcome in this game is for every player to contribute the 
entire amount to the public pool. Total contribution to the public pool is $20 which is doubled to $40 
by the experimenter and redistributed back to the group members netting each person $10. Each 
member then gets a 100% return on her initial investment. However individual rationality suggests a 
different course of action. Think about an individual player trying to decide how much to contribute. If 
this individual contributes $1 and no one else contributes anything, then the $1 is doubled to $2. 
Distributed equally between the four players, gives each player $0.50. The player who contributed the 
$1 is worse off (incurs a 50% loss on the investment) while every other player is better off at the 
expense of the player who contributed. Thus if a player does not contribute, then she is no worse off if 
no one else contributes, but she is actually better off if some others contribute, while she herself does 
not.  
   4
time. In repeated plays of the game, contributions often start out at between 40% and 
60% but then contributions decline steadily over time as more and more players 
choose to “free ride.”  
In this paper we approach the issue of free-riding in public goods games from 
a different perspective. We use an inter-generational framework where a group of 
subjects are recruited into the lab and play the public goods game for 10 periods (the 
exact experimental design and parameters are explained in Section 2). After her 
participation is over, each player is replaced by another player, her laboratory 
descendant, who then plays the game for another 10 periods as a member of a fresh 
group of subjects. The generations are therefore non-overlapping. Advice from a 
member of one generation to her successor can be passed along via free-form 
messages that generation t players leave for their generation  1 t +  successors. Finally, 
payoffs span generations in the sense that the payoff to a generation t player is equal 
to what she has earned during her lifetime plus 50% of what her laboratory 
descendant earns. This was done to provide an incentive to the subjects to pass on 
meaningful advice to their successors.TP
2
PT  
We incorporate two separate mechanisms for passing advice from one 
generation to the next. The first is the “private advice” treatment where advice from 
one subject in generation t is given to her immediate successor in period  1 t + . The 
second is the “public advice” treatment where advice from one generation of players 
is made public to the next generation in the sense that all the advice left by the former 
group is made available to all the members of the latter group. Moreover, this advice 
is read aloud by the experimenter for all members of the group to hear. Behaviour by 
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2
PT This inter-generational framework was pioneered in Schotter and Sopher (2003, 2001a, 2001b) where 
the authors study the battle of the sexes game, the trust game and the ultimatum game respectively. 
Chaudhuri, Schotter and Sopher (2001) use this framework to study a coordination problem with 
multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. Schotter (2003) provides a broad overview of the findings and 
insights from this line of inquiry.    5
the subjects in the two advice treatments is compared to that in a no-advice treatment, 
which simply replicates a standard public goods experiment a number of times. 
The public goods game is an excellent vehicle for understanding the inherent 
tension between cooperative and competitive behaviour in social dilemmas. A public 
goods game is really an n-person prisoner’s dilemma where free-riding is the 
dominant strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-shot version of the game and also the 
subgame perfect outcome in finitely repeated versions of the game. It is also the 
evolutionarily stable strategy in such situations. See the discussion in Miller and 
Andreoni (1991) among others. As is well documented in the literature, however, 
while free-riding does occur in finitely repeated versions of such games still the game 
theoretic prediction of total free-riding is clearly refuted even after a number of 
rounds. Most laboratory studies of the public goods game (see the references above) 
find significantly high levels of cooperation. Andreoni (1995a) finds that there is 
significant kindness behind the decision to contribute. Andreoni (1995a, p. 899) goes 
on to say, “Kindness in experiments corresponds to a large body of evidence from 
privately provided public goods, like charitable giving, which indicates that people 
contribute more than the theory predicts.” 
We believe that in real life human beings approach such social dilemmas in a 
manner that is different from those captured in previous public good experiments. 
When confronted with such situations we have access to the wisdom of the past in the 
sense that those who have played before us (or at least immediately before us) are 
available to give us advice as to how to play. While the conventions passed from one 
generation of decision makers to the next may not be efficient solutions to the 
problem at hand, they at least avoid the need to have these problems solved repeatedly 
each time a new agent or set of agents arrive. Our conjecture is that playing a public   6
goods game using such an inter-generational design, over time, will lead to the 
evolution of norms of cooperation with later generations not only achieving higher 
levels of contribution but also managing to mitigate problems of free-riding. Norms or 
conventions of behaviour – so-called “memes” (a term coined by Dawkins, 1976) – 
that arise during one generation may be passed on to the successors.TP
3
PT  We believe that 
in this context, the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy does not adequately 
capture the way in which social evolution, as opposed to biological evolution, might 
function. This is primarily because the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies is 
“unthinking” and does not allow for socialization and learning and therefore it may 
not be able to explain large patterns of human cooperation. To do so we need theories 
of cultural evolution or gene-culture co-evolution along the lines of Boyd and 
Richerson (1985) and Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981). We view social 
conventions as artefacts that can be established in an early generation and passed on 
from generation to generation in the history of a human society. The inter-
generational framework that we use is an attempt to capture the evolution of such 
social norms.  
Chaudhuri and Graziano (2003), using the same data-set as in this study, find 
that when the advice left by one group of subjects is “public” (in the sense that it is 
made available to all the members of the succeeding group and also read aloud for all 
to hear), then this advice has a significant positive impact on contributions. 
Contributions in the public advice treatment average 81% (aggregated over all 
generations and all rounds), which far exceeds the 51.7% average contribution level 
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3
PT Dawkins (1976, p. 189-192) comments “Cultural transmission is analogous to genetic transmission in 
that, although basically conservative, it can give rise to a form of evolution. …Examples of memes are 
tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes, fashions, ways of making pots or building arches. Just as genes 
propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes 
propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad 
sense, can be called imitation.”  
   7
attained in the “private” advice (that is, advice from one subject is given only to her 
immediate successor) treatment. Moreover public advice leads to increasing 
contributions over generations and mitigates problems of free-riding with later 
generations achieving contribution levels of 90% or more. One generation even 
manages to sustain contribution of 100% in 8 out of 10 rounds. No such trend was 
apparent when this advice was private.  
What explains such high levels of contribution in the public advice treatment? 
Rabin (1998) has pointed out that if one assumes the existence of reciprocal altruism 
then it is possible to think about the public goods game as a coordination problem 
where high contributions are efficient equilibria and low contributions are inefficient 
equilibria. Michael Chwe in his book “Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination and 
Common Knowledge” talks at length about the role of common knowledge in 
fostering coordination. Chwe (2001, p. 3), in talking about a variety of situations 
where coordinated action is called for, comments  
“Because each individual wants to participate only if others do, each person 
must also know that others received a message. For that matter, because each 
person knows that other people need to be confident that others will 
participate, each person must know that other people know that other people 
have received a message, and so forth. In other words, knowledge of the 
message is not enough; what is also required is knowledge of others’ 
knowledge, knowledge of others’ knowledge of others’ knowledge and so on – 
that is “common knowledge. To understand how people solve coordination 
problems, we should thus look at social processes that generate common 
knowledge.” 
 
The argument is that when advice from a previous generation is made public and also 
read aloud, a common knowledge situation is created where subjects feel emboldened 
enough to choose higher contribution levels. See Chaudhuri and Graziano (2003) for a 
detailed exposition on the evolution of contributions, the nature of the advice left by 
subjects and the impact of advice on contributions over time as well as the   8




In this paper we revisit the data from Chaudhuri and Graziano (2003) but this 
time the focus is on the evolution of contributions and the analysis of disaggregated 
(individual level) data using a dynamic panel regression model.  In our experiments a 
subject is tracked over time as she interacts with her group members and decides on 
how much to contribute to the public good in each of multiple rounds. Therefore the 
data generated has a panel structure. Moreover given that contributions are bounded 
by zero from below and by the token endowment in each period from above (since a 
subject’s contribution to the public good in any period cannot exceed her endowment 
for that period), the data collected in this setting is doubly censored. Taking the panel 
structure of the data into consideration allows us to better model the dynamics of the 
process. It enables us to better understand how contributions in each period respond to 
various factors such as contributions made by the individual in the previous period, 
average contributions made by the group in the previous period and whether the 
individual was above or below the average in the previous period. The other 
contribution of this paper is to present an innovative way to analyse the data in similar 
public goods game experiments. To the best our knowledge Ashley, Ball and Eckel 
(2003) is the only other study, which uses a panel data model to analyse voluntary 
contributions to a public good.TP
5
PT However unlike Ashley, Ball and Eckel (2003) who 
use a Tobit model with player fixed effects, we use a random effects Tobit model with 
double censoring, which in our view is the correct model to use in such situations 
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4
PT The advice left by each subject is included in Chaudhuri and Graziano (2003). Interested readers can 
get a copy by writing to Chaudhuri at HTUa.chaudhuri@auckland.ac.nzUTH. The Chaudhuri and Graziano 
(2003) paper is also available from the website of the Social Science Research Network (SSRN), 




PT They use data from the papers by Isaak and Walker (1988b) and Andreoni (1995b) for this purpose.    9
since a Tobit model with player fixed effects generates biased estimates. However we 
also compare the estimates from our random effects Tobit model with those produced 
by an unconditional Tobit model with player fixed effects (as in Ashley, Ball and 
Eckel (2003)) and a linear random effects model.  
There are a number of insights that come out of our dynamic analysis of the 
data. First and foremost among these is the finding that contributions in any period 
depend crucially on the group average in the previous period or more specifically 
whether a subject’s own contribution in the previous period fell above or below the 
group average. We find that those who were above the average in the previous period 
lowered their contribution in the next period. This is in keeping with prior findings 
that subjects reduce contribution to avoid being a “sucker”. (Orbell and Dawes, 1981). 
But what is surprising is that in the public advice treatment, when a subject’s 
contribution fell below the group average in the previous period there is a tendency on 
the part of that subject to increase contributions in the next period. This behaviour 
seems to be the primary driving force behind the high rates of contribution in the 
public advice treatment. While we do not know for sure the reasons behind this 
behaviour one could conjecture that a subject feels guilt for free-riding and increases 
contribution in the next period. No such trend is apparent in the private advice 
treatment. Thus it seems that the public advice treatment manages to generate and 
sustain a norm of high contribution to the public good and subjects who deviate from 
this norm in one period seem compelled to rectify that deviation in the succeeding 
period by increasing their contribution to the public good.  In addition our results 
suggest that subjects of European ethnicity appear to have internalised this norm more 
than subjects of non-European heritage.    10
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we explain the 
experimental design. This is the same design and data set that is described in 
Chaudhuri and Graziano (2003). In Section 3 we provide a broad overview of the 
data. In Section 4 we discuss our econometric methodology. In Section 5 we present 
our results and finally in Section 6 we discuss the implications of our results and make 
some concluding remarks.  
2. Experimental Design 
All the experiments for this project were carried out as non-computerized class 
room experiments using students at Wellesley College. Students were recruited via 
postings on an electronic bulletin board. A total of seventeen sessions were held with 
five students in each session. The composition of the group remains unchanged during 
the course of a session.  Our set-up then corresponds to a “partners” protocol as in 
Andreoni (1988). Each session constituted one generation and consisted of 5 players 
playing the public goods game for 10 periods. This group of 5 is then replaced by 5 
successors who take their place and play on. When generations change, after 10 
periods of repetition, outgoing agents are allowed to pass on advice through free-form 
written messages to their successors.  
In our “private advice” treatment, a message left by one player can be seen 
only by her immediate successor. In the “public advice” treatment, on the other hand, 
advice left by one group of players is “made public.” All 5 pieces of advice left by 
this group is given to all 5 players in the next generation, and in addition this advice is 
read aloud by the experimenter before the start of the actual game.TP
6
PT Payoffs to an 
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PT We would like to point out that all the experiments for this paper were carried out by the third co-
author who was an undergraduate student at Wellesley College at that time (Fall 2002). It was she, a 
peer of the experimental subjects, who read out all the instructions and the advice. Thus any changes in 
behaviour  between the private and public advice sessions cannot be attributed to the fact that a 
professor, who is in a position of authority, is making the announcements and coming from a 
authoritative figure such pronouncements have a large impact on behavior.   11
agent is the sum of the amounts that an agent earns during her lifetime plus 50% of 
what her successor earns in the next generation so there is partial inter-generational 
caring. This second payment is designed to act as an incentive for subjects to leave 
meaningful advice. The subjects are paid their actual earnings from a session 
immediately upon completion of the session. They are told that they will be contacted 
via e-mail/phone at a later date and given a second payment (based on the earnings of 
their successors). This second payment was handed out to the subjects after we had 
finished running all the sessions. Every player involved in the study received both the 
first and the second payments.  
Also, before the start of the actual rounds and before the advice is made 
available to the players, we ask them about their expectations regarding the other 
players. Specifically, we ask them how much they expect the other group members to 
contribute on average in round 1. This gives us insight into the subject’s beliefs about 
her fellow players. We do not make use of the data on expectations for the purposes of 
the present study.  
Prior to the first period of any generation, subjects are presented with a set of 
written instructions that are read out loud to them after they are finished reading them 
privately. After questions are answered subjects are asked the question about their 
expectations regarding period 1 contributions by fellow group members. Then, 
depending on the treatment, they are allowed to read the advice offered by their 
immediate predecessor (in the private advice treatment) or by the immediately 
preceding group of players (in the public advice). In the latter case the advice is also 
read aloud by the experimenter.  
The public goods game was played in the following way. Each group, 
consisting of 5 subjects, is told that each of them has 10 tokens for each one of 10   12
rounds.TP
7
PT At the beginning of each round (t), each participant i must make a decision 
on how many of the 10 tokens she wants to contribute to a public account 
() 01 0 it C ≤≤ and how many tokens she wants to keep for herself in her private 
account. Contributions are in whole numbers only and are made simultaneously by all 
the subjects in a group. After all participants had made their decisions, the total tokens 
contributed to the public account are added up and then doubled by the experimenter. 
This doubled amount is then divided equally among all five participants. The 
participant’s personal earning for each round is the sum of the tokens she decided to 
keep in her private account and the tokens she received back from the public account. 
Total contributions to the public account and the number of tokens that each 
participant received from the public pool were announced at the end of each round. 
Following this the participants made their decisions for the succeeding round. Each 
successive round proceeded in the same manner. Each token was worth $0.05. 
Balances are not carried over from one round to the next.  
The payoff for each subject i in any period t then is  
5
1 10 0.4 ; 1, ,10 it it it i CC t
= Π= − + = ∑ K  
In our case the marginal per capita return from a contribution to the public good is 0.4 
since all contributions are doubled and split 5-ways. The total payoff to a subject is 







⎝⎠ ∑ . It follows that full free 
riding  () 0 it C =  is a dominant strategy in the stage game. This is because 
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PT We will use the terms round and period inter-changeably. They refer to the same thing.    13
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After the last period, subjects are asked to write advice to their successors and 
leave. The subjects were also asked separately to indicate a period 1 contribution to 
their successors by writing a specific number. We provided the next group of subjects 
with the free-from messages but not the actual number (though a vast majority of 
subjects included this number in their free-form advice as well). When they wrote 
advice the subjects knew whether it was to be made public to all five subjects in the 
next generation or simply be read privately by their successor. They were paid the 
sum of their payoffs in the 10 period game they played, plus 50% of what their 
successors earned as a second payment at a later date. 
We performed a set of four different experiments that varied according to the 
information available to subjects. In Experiment 1, the Replicator (No-Advice) 
Experiment, we simply replicate the standard public goods experiments, five times 
with 5 subjects in each group, without either generations or advice. In short, we 
simply ran the public goods game five times with five subjects for 10 periods. This 
group serves as the control group against which we intend to compare the behaviour 
of our two experimental groups – one that gets private advice from the immediate 
predecessor and the other that gets public advice from the immediately preceding 
group.  
  In running our inter-generational experiments we started (in Experiment 2) by 
running a  “Progenitor” experiment in which 5 subjects played the public goods game 
for the first time and hence with no advice. This generation was the progenitor of all 
the generations in the two advice treatments – private and public – that followed in the   14
sense that the first generations in each treatment used the advice of this progenitor 
generation.TP
8
PT In Experiment 3 we had five generations of subjects play the public 
goods game with private advice, where each subject could receive advice from her 
immediate predecessor. So while each agent knew that the others were receiving 
advice, they did not know the content of any advice other than their own. Finally, 
Experiment 4 was a public advice experiment, which consisted of six generations. The 
first generation here received a sheet with all the advice from the progenitor 
experiment. However, this advice was also read aloud for all the subjects to hear, so 
the content of the advice on these sheets was common knowledge. Our experimental 
design is explained in Table 1 and Table 2. Each session lasted about 40 minutes (the 
advice sessions took a little longer than the ones without advice) and the average 
payoff to the subjects was $12.30.  
3. Overview of the evolution of contributions  
We are primarily interested in understanding what happens to contributions 
over time. Before proceeding to our econometric analysis it is worth taking a broad 
overview of the data. In Table 3, we present the levels of contribution over 10 rounds 
aggregated over all generations (or groups) in the three treatments. As can be seen 
from the table, contributions in the public advice treatment are much higher than that 
in either the private advice or no advice treatment. Average contribution in the public 
advice treatment starts at 9.53 tokens out of 10 (95.3%) in round 1, which is close to 
the efficient contribution level of 10 tokens. While average contributions do decline 
over the 10 rounds still by the 10P
th
P round contribution in the public advice treatment is 
at a robust 61%. Contributions in the private advice treatment start at 74.4% in round 
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8
PT Since the participants in the “progenitor” sessions did not receive any advice, for the econometric 
analysis that follows, the progenitor session is regarded as a no advice session, effectively giving us 6 
no advice groups.    15
1 and fall to 27.6% in round 10. In our replicator (no advice) treatment, contributions 
start at 48.4% and drop to 38% by round 10. Aggregating over generations and advice 
we find that the public advice groups manage to achieve 81% contribution on average. 
This is significantly higher than the average of 51.7% achieved by the private advice 
groups (z = 5.416, p-value < 0.01 using the non-parametric Wilcoxon test). 
Contributions in the public advice treatment are also significantly higher than those in 
the no-advice treatment, which averaged 44.88% (z = 5.937, p-value < 0.01). Figure 1 
presents the evolution of average contributions by period and treatment. Contributions 
decline over time in all three treatments. In every period, average contributions in the 
public advice treatment sessions exceed the average contributions in the private 
advice and no advice treatment sessions. When comparing the private and no advice 
sessions we see that the average contributions in the private advice sessions are higher 
to begin with (periods 1 – 5) but beyond period 5, average contributions in the private 
advice sessions are actually lower.  
  Remember that players can contribute any amount between 0 and 10. The 
maximum contribution is 10 (in this case we will say that contribution is upper 
censored) and the minimum contribution is 0 (in this case we will say that the 
contribution is lower censored). In Figure 2, we present the histogram of the 
contributions by treatment. It follows that a large majority of the players contribute 
their entire endowment of 10 tokens in the public advice sessions (see Panel C). 
Figure 3 presents the proportion of individuals who contributed the maximum in each 
period by treatment. It is clear that the percentage of players who contribute the 
maximum in each period is the highest in the public advice sessions. However this 
proportion does decrease over time – falling from 73% in Period 1 to 47% in Period 
10. With the exception of Period 1, the proportion that contributes the maximum is   16
higher in the no advice session relative to the private advice session in each period. In 
Figure 4 we show the proportion of individuals who contribute the minimum in each 
period, by treatment. Once again we note that the proportion of players who 
contributed the minimum is the lowest in public advice treatment. The proportion 
contributing the minimum in the private advice sessions is low in the beginning but 
beyond period 5 this proportion rises significantly and in the last two periods the 
proportion contributing the minimum in the private advice sessions is significantly 
higher than the no advice or public advice treatments. 
4. Estimation Methodology 
As noted earlier our primary aim is to understand what is happening to 
contributions over time and the factors that impact contributions. To that end we 
define  it C  as the contribution of player i in period t. We have 85 players, each 
choosing a contribution level for 10 periods, thereby giving us 850 observations. This 
observed contribution  it C  equals the desired contribution, 
*
it C  (which is a latent 
variable) if and only if 
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it C  is determined by the following equation: 
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 for  1, , in = K  and  1, , tT = K . The random effects ( ) i ν  are IID  ( )
2 0, N ν σ  and  it ε  are 
()
2 0, N ε σ  independently of  i ν . Here  it X  denotes a vector of time invariant effects 
(like treatment effects), time varying variables (like an individual’s contribution in the 
previous period or the deviation of an individual’s contribution from the average   17
group contribution in the previous period), and an overall time effect, which is 
common to all players. We estimate this model as a random effects Tobit.TP
9
PT For the 
sake of comparison we also compute the (linear) random effects regression where, by 
definition, we do not account for the upper and lower censoring of the dependent 
variable (contribution by player i at time t). However note that the linear random 
effects estimates are inconsistent. Under the assumption of normal distribution for the 
random effects ( ) i ν , we can write the joint (unconditional of  i ν ) density of the 
observed data from the i P
th
P panel as  
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where C  is the set of non-censored observations, L is the set of left (lower) censored 
observations,  R  is the set of right (upper) censored observations and  () Φ  is the 
cumulative normal distribution. The log Likelihood function can be written as: 
  () {} 11
1
log , , | , ,
n
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PT We cannot compute the corresponding fixed effects Tobit model as there does not exist a sufficient 
statistic allowing the fixed effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood function. We do examine the 
robustness of the results by computing the unconditional Tobit estimates with player fixed effects. 
However these unconditional fixed effects Tobit estimates are biased.    18
5. Results 
Table 4: presents the Random Effects Tobit Regression for the variable of 
interest: contribution of player i in period t  ( ) it C . We estimate and present four 
different specifications. In specification 1 - the most parsimonious specification – the 
set of explanatory variables includes only two treatment dummies (Private Advice and 
Public Advice). Here the no advice treatment is the reference category. In 
specification 2 we add the variable time. However we incorporate the effect of time as 
() 1
t . This has two advantages. First it allows us to capture the non-linearity in the 
effect of time on contributions. Second it allows us to distinguish between the effects 
of early and later periods on contributions. Specification 3 adds contribution made by 
each subject in the previous period ( ) ,1 it C − . Finally specification 4 – the complete 
specification – also includes the deviation of an individual’s contribution from the 










Λ= − ∑ . A positive  ,1 it − Λ  implies that individual i had contributed 
less than the group average in the previous period and a negative  ,1 it − Λ  implies that 
individual i had contributed more than the group average in the previous period. We 
should point out that in specifications 3 and 4 we lose one period in each session for 
each player, since we have introduced lagged variables. So the number of 
observations in these two specifications comes down to 765.  
A look at the Random Effects Tobit results presented in Table 4: reveals the 
following results. First, relative to the no advice sessions (the reference category) 
contributions are significantly higher in the public advice sessions. In every 
specification, the coefficient estimate of the public advice dummy is positive and   19
statistically significant. However the coefficient estimate of the private advice dummy 
is positive in specifications 1 and 2 and negative in specifications 3 and 4 though it is 
statistically significant only for specification 3. We conduct a test for the equality of 
the two treatment dummies. The null hypothesis that the treatment dummies have 
similar effects on contributions is rejected for every specification.  We conclude that 
contributions are significantly higher in the public advice treatment as compared to 
the no advice treatment. However there seem to be no significant differences between 
contributions in the private advice and no advice treatments. 
Second, an increase in previous period’s contribution increased current 
period’s contribution – the coefficient estimate of  ,1 it C −  is positive and statistically 
significant. Note that the magnitude of the coefficient estimate of  ,1 it C −  is more than 
double in specification 4, where we control for deviations from the group average, as 
compared to specification 3. 
Third, the coefficient estimate of  ,1 it − Λ  is positive and statistically significant. 
This essentially implies that an increase in  ,1 it − Λ  is associated with an increase in 
contributions. Another way of looking at it is that a positive  ,1 it − Λ  is associated with a 
higher  it C  and a negative  ,1 it − Λ  is associated with a lower  it C . A positive  ,1 it − Λ  
implies that the individual’s contribution in the previous period is actually less than 
the group average for the previous period. Therefore if an individual contributes less 
than the group average in one period, she responds by increasing contributions in the 
next period and the further away the individual is from the group average in period 
1 t − , the greater is her contribution in period t. This, we believe, is the most 
important insight of this study. Below we will explore this phenomenon in greater 
detail. We will show that this tendency is the strongest in the public advice treatment   20
and that it provides a strong vindication of our claim that the public advice treatment 
leads to the creation of virtuous norms that manage to sustain high levels of 
cooperation. Those who were above the group average in the previous period however 
respond by reducing their contribution in the next period. 
Finally, and no surprises here, contributions fall over time – as t increases, 
1
t  decreases and this is associated with a reduction in contributions and hence the 
positive coefficient of  1
t . This holds for every specification.  
We next examine the sensitivity of the results to alternative estimation 
techniques. We compare the random effects Tobit estimates to estimates derived using 
two alternative methods: the fixed effects unconditional Tobit and the (linear) random 
effects. In Table 5 we present the coefficient estimates and the corresponding standard 
errors from the three models using the complete specification which includes the two 
treatment dummies for private and public advice, the non-linear specification for time 
() 1
t , lagged contributions () ,1 it C −  and lagged deviation of previous period’s 
contribution by each subject from the group average ( ) ,1 it − Λ . We cannot compute the 
corresponding fixed effects Tobit model since there is no sufficient statistic allowing 
the fixed effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood function. We do examine the 
robustness of the results by computing the unconditional Tobit estimates with player 
fixed effects.TP
10
PT However these unconditional fixed effects Tobit estimates are biased. 
The player fixed effects turn out to be jointly statistically significant (p-value = 0.00). 
The (linear) random effects estimates, on the other hand, are inconsistent. A 
comparison of the three sets of estimates presented in Table 5 reveals the following. 
                                                 
TP
10
PT As far as player fixed effects are concerned, we are only able to include in the set of explanatory 
variables dummies for those players who are not censored in every period.    21
First, contributions decline over time. It is worth noting however that what  1
t  
captures is essentially the effect of initial periods. The magnitude of the coefficient 
estimates implies that the contributions in the initial period is the highest in the fixed 
effect unconditional Tobit and the lowest in the linear random effects regression. 
Second, there is significant dynamics in contributions – contribution in period t is 
significantly affected by contribution in period  1 t −  and the coefficient estimate of 
,1 it C −  is always positive. One important point to note is that while the fixed effects 
unconditional Tobit regression under estimates this effect, the linear random effects 
regression over estimates this effect relative to the random effects Tobit regression. 
Third, once again the group effects are statistically significant. The coefficient 
estimates of  ,1 it − Λ  show that irrespective of the estimation methodology used, if an 
individual contributes less than the group average in period  1 t − , she responds by 
contributing more in period t and the further away she is from the group average in 
period  1 t −  the higher is the contribution in period t. However it is worth noting that 
both the fixed effects conditional Tobit and the linear random effects regressions both 
under estimate this effect relative to the random effects Tobit regression. Finally, the 
signs and statistical significance of the two treatment dummies are interesting. Note 
that in the two Tobit regressions the public advice dummy is positive and statistically 
significant while in the linear random effects regression the public advice dummy is 
positive but not statistically significant. So relative to the no advice sessions, 
contributions are generally higher in the public advice sessions. On the other hand in 
all three regressions the private advice dummy is negative. It is statistically significant 
in the fixed effects unconditional Tobit and weakly significant in the linear random 
effects regression. The actual magnitude of the coefficient is higher in the linear   22
random effects regression compared to the random effects Tobit regression. The 
coefficient estimates reveal that the fixed effects Tobit regression over estimates 
contribution in the public advice treatment and under estimates contribution in the 
private advice treatment (relative to the no advice treatment). Using a standard  ()
2 1 χ  
test the null hypothesis of equality of treatment effect is always rejected but it is worth 
noting that the null hypothesis is only weakly rejected (at 10%) in the linear random 
effects regression.  
Thus far we have captured the difference between the treatments using 
treatment dummies. In the first three columns of Table 6 we present the random 
effects Tobit regression of contribution after stratifying the sample by session type – 
private advice, public advice and no advice. It is worth pointing out that in the public 
advice session, the proportion of upper censored observations is significantly higher 
(53.70%) compared to either the private advice (4.89%) and the no advice (15.93%) 
sessions.  
The coefficient estimate of  1
t  is positive and statistically significant in every 
treatment showing that contributions decline over time. However ceteris paribus in 
every period, contributions are the highest in the public advice sessions and the lowest 
in the private advice sessions with contributions in the no advice sessions lying in 
between.  
In every treatment contributions in the previous period ( ) ,1 it C −  have a positive 
and statistically significant effect on contributions in the current period. However the 
cross period effects are the strongest in the no advice sessions and the weakest in the 
public advice sessions. We believe this is because in the public advice treatment   
group contributions matter more than one’s individual contribution while in the other   23
two treatments group contributions have much less impact on individual 
contributions. 
The coefficient estimates of  ,1 it − Λ  are always positive and statistically 
significant. If an individual contributes less than the group average in period  1 t − , she 
responds by increasing his contributions in period t. But this group effect is the 
strongest in the public advice sessions and the lowest in the no advice sessions with 
the private advice sessions lying in between.   
While stratifying the sample by treatment allows us to compare the three cases 
directly, it has the disadvantage of not enabling us to use the full set of observations. 
An alternative to estimation on sub-samples is to use treatment dummies and interact 
the dummies with all explanatory variables. This is what we do next. We restrict 
ourselves to the private and public advice sessions (i.e., ignore the no advice 
sessions). Apart from  ,1 ,1 1 ,, it it C t −− Λ , we include in the set of explanatory variables a 
public advice treatment dummy and also interact this dummy with each of the 
explanatory variables () ,1 ,1 1 ,, it it C t −− Λ . In this case the non-interacted coefficients 
give the effect for the private advice treatment and the interacted coefficients give the 
public advice – private advice difference. The coefficient estimates are presented in 
Column 4 of Table 6. Note that the only interaction effect that is statistically 
significant is  ,1  Public Advice it − Λ× . In addition the non-interacted coefficient  ,1 it − Λ  
is also positive and marginally significant. Essentially there is a group effect and the 
coefficient estimates show that this group effect is significantly stronger for the public 
advice sessions compared to the private advice sessions.     24
What exactly is the source of the differential group effects in the public and 
private advice treatments? To understand this we sub-divide the subjects in these two 
treatments into two groups – those who contributed equal to or more than the average 
in a given period i.e. subjects for whom  ,1 it − Λ ≤ 0 and those who contributed less than 
the group average for a given period, i.e. subjects for whom  ,1 it − Λ  > 0. Once we know 
whether a subject was above or below the average in period t-1, we then look at how 
she responded in period t, i.e. what happened to her contribution in the succeeding 
period. In Table 7 we present the average change in contribution from period  1 t −  to 
period  t depending on whether  ,1 it − Λ ≤ 0 or  ,1 it − Λ  > 0, for the public and private 
advice treatments.  0 it C ∆ >  implies that an individual increases her contribution while 
0 it C ∆<  implies that an individual reduces her contribution between periods t-1 and t. 
We find that in the private advice treatment  0 it C ∆ <  always, i.e., contributions in 
period t decline regardless of whether a subject contributed equal to or more than the 
average in period t-1 (i.e.  ,1 it − Λ ≤ 0) or contributed less than the group average is 
period t-1 (i.e.,  ,1 it − Λ  > 0). However the responses of those above and below the 
average are different. Those at or above the average in period t-1 (i.e.  ,1 it − Λ ≤ 0) 
reduced their contribution by approximately 9.4 percentage points in period t while 
those below the average (i.e.,  ,1 it − Λ  > 0) reduced their contributions by roughly 4 
percentage points. In the public advice treatment, on the other hand when the subject 
contributed less than the group average i.e. ,1 it − Λ  > 0, that subject actually increased 
her contribution in the succeeding period by roughly 9.75 percentage points (∆CBit
B = 
0.975 > 0). Those at or above the average (i.e.,  ,1 it − Λ  > 0) however reduce their 
contribution (by 9.5 percentage points) in the succeeding period even in the public   25
advice treatment. However the magnitudes of these two responses are close to one 
another with the reduction in contributions by one group being virtually offset by the 
increase in contributions by the other group. The very different response of those who 
were below the average in the two treatments gives us this strong asymmetric group 
effect.  
At the end of each session the participants were asked to fill up a small 
questionnaire. In particular they were asked what their ethnicity was. We created the 
variable WHITE (= 1 if the participant was White, 0 if Asian or Hispanic). We used 
this variable to examine whether there are any ethnic differences in contributions. A 
positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with this ethnicity variable 
would imply that White participants contribute more, relative to those who identify 
themselves as Asian or Hispanic. However in this case there was some missing data 
and we have information for 82 of the 85 players. We conduct four sets of 
estimations: all sessions, with treatment dummies (private and public advice session 
dummies), and separately for the private advice, public advice and no advice sessions. 
The coefficient estimates are presented in Table 8. Overall ethnicity does not matter – 
the coefficient of WHITE is not statistically significant. See Column 1 of Table 8. 
However when we examine each session separately, we find that the ethnicity dummy 
is positive and statistically significant in the public advice sessions only.  What the 
results imply is that in public advice sessions, participants who identify themselves as 
White contribute more than those who identify themselves as Asian or Hispanic but 
no such difference exists in the private advice and no advice sessions.  
Finally to examine the robustness of our results we run regressions where the 
dependent variable is the change in contribution from period  1 t −  to period t () it C ∆ . 
The estimating equation now is    26
  it it i it CX β νε ∆ =+ +  
Note that there is no censoring in the dependent variable any more. We estimate this 
equation as a linear random effects model. The explanatory variables are the same 
(private and public advice treatment dummies,  1
t ,  ,1 it C −  and  ,1 it − Λ . The coefficient 
estimates are presented in Table 9 (Column (1)). The private advice session dummy is 
negative and weakly statistically significant but the public advice dummy is positive 
but not statistically significant. The coefficient estimate of  ,1 it C −  is negative and 
statistically significant – the higher is the contribution in period  1 t −  the lower is the 
change in contribution from period  1 t −  to t. Finally the group effect () ,1 it − Λ  
continues to be positive and statistically significant – if an individual contributes less 
than the group average in period  1 t −   ( ) ,1 0 it − Λ >  the change in contribution is 
positive and the further away the individual is from the group average in period  1 t − , 
the higher is the change in contribution from period  1 t −  to t. We re-estimated this 
specification separately for each treatment. The results presented in Table 9 (columns 
2, 3 and 4) show that, while the coefficient of  ,1 it − Λ  is always positive it is not 
statistically significant for the private advice sessions. The coefficient estimates also 
imply that the response (in terms of change in contribution from period  1 t −  to period 
t) to the deviation from the group average is the highest in the public advice sessions.  
This once again strengthens our case about the positive group effects in the public 
advice treatment.  
   27
6. Discussion of our remarks and some concluding comments 
There are a number of insights that come out of our dynamic analysis of the 
data. First and foremost among these is the finding that contributions in any period 
depend crucially on the group average in the previous period or more specifically 
whether a subject’s own contribution in the previous period fell above or below the 
group average. We find that when a subject’s contribution fell below the group 
average in the previous period there is a tendency on the part of that subject to 
increase contributions in the next period possibly due to guilt for free-riding. This in 
turn leads to increased contribution in the next period. However as we show in Table 
6, this effect is really strong in the public advice treatment. Thus it is clear that it is 
only the public advice treatment, which manages to generate and sustain a norm of 
high contribution to the public goods, and subjects who deviate from this norm in one 
period seem compelled to rectify that deviation in the succeeding period by increasing 
their contribution to the public good.  In addition, the coefficient estimates presented 
in Table 8 suggest that subjects of European ethnicity seem to have internalized this 
norm more than subjects of non-European heritage.  
Based on our results we would like to draw a connection between our findings 
and two other broad research themes in the literature – first, the idea of altruistic 
punishment in humans and second, the general issue of sustaining cooperation is 
social dilemmas. There is now a voluminous body of evidence showing that a large 
number of subjects in experimental games are conditional co-operators, i.e. they will 
cooperate as long as they expect other subjects to cooperate.TP
11
PT See for instance the 
papers by Fishbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) and Gächter, Hermann and Thöni 
(2003), Keser and van Winden (2000) for public goods games and Chaudhuri and 
                                                 
TP
11
PT Ernst Fehr and his associates have done extensive research along these lines. See for instance Fehr 
and Gächter (2000, 2002), Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) and Fisbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001).    28
Gangadharan (2003) for the trust game. This is analogous to Axelrod’s (1984) concept 
of Tit-for-Tat cooperation in games. Moreover Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), 
Gächter, Hermann and Thöni (2003) and Masclet et al. (2003) show that conditional 
cooperators are willing to punish non-cooperators for their non-cooperation even if 
such punishment has pecuniary costs for the cooperators. Conditional cooperation 
coupled with the opportunity to punish non-cooperators (who violate norms of 
cooperation among players) results in subjects being able to sustain high levels of 
cooperation over time. In fact Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Bowles and Gintis (2002) 
suggest that such “altruistic punishment” by homo reciprocans – humans who are 
willing to punish free-riders even when such punishment is costly to the punishers – 
may be the primary driving force behind sustaining cooperation in a variety of social 
dilemmas. Our results suggest that given the presence of a large number of 
conditional cooperators, communities may be able to create inherent social norms that 
lead to efficient levels of contribution to the public good even in the absence of 
punishment mechanisms. All that is needed is the creation of conducive conditions 
that lead to the generation of optimistic beliefs about other subjects. Once subjects 
have adequately optimistic beliefs about one another then a group of conditional 
cooperators may be able to sustain cooperation even without the explicit threat of 
punishments. Punishments (or the threat thereof) will keep contributions high but we 
have shown that while punishments may be sufficient to sustain cooperation they may 
not be necessary.TP
12
PT It is possible to argue that the groups in our experiment who 
receive public advice are more “socially connected” – in the sense of Putnam (2000) – 
than the groups who receive private or no advice. What we find is that such socially 
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12
PT See Fehr and Gächter (2000) for examples of social situations where cooperators can actually punish 
non-cooperators for their lack of cooperation.   29
connected groups may be able to generate social norms that serve the same purpose of 
sustaining cooperation.  
Our results have implications for the general evolution of cooperation in social 
dilemmas as well. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) argue that in the presence of Tit-for-
Tat (TFT) players, as in Axelrod (1984), it is possible to think of a public goods game 
as a coordination problem and the problem of sustaining cooperation in this context as 
really a problem of equilibrium selection. In the presence of TFT players a prisoner’s 
dilemma game (and the public goods game is in essence an n-person prisoner’s 
dilemma) can be converted into a coordination problem with two Pareto-ranked 
equilibria – one payoff dominant and the other risk-dominant. Axelrod and Hamilton 
further show that the evolutionary dynamics in such games are able to sustain stable 
polymorphic equilibria where the population converges to one of the two equilibria. If 
the population consists of a majority of defectors then the evolutionary dynamics lead 
to a convergence to the risk dominant outcome where everyone defects (or free-rides 
in the case of public goods). However they demonstrate that once the number of TFT 
players exceeds a certain threshold the population is able to sustain the cooperative 
outcome as an evolutionarily stable outcome. So in the presence of a large number of 
conditional cooperators it is possible to sustain cooperative behaviour. However how 
could TFT players succeed in sustaining cooperation if the majority of players are 
using a strategy of defection? One answer, Axelrod and Hamilton suggest, is 
clustering, i.e. TFT players need to arrive in clusters.  We believe that our results 
suggest another mechanism. We posit that at least in human interactions players are 
not constrained to play genetically hard-wired strategies such as cooperate or defect. 
Players choose a strategy based on their beliefs about the distribution of types within 
the population. If players place a large enough probability on the presence of TFT   30
players then they might be predisposed to cooperate to begin with. The answer we 
believe lies with the creation of strong enough beliefs about the presence of other 
conditional cooperators. Our public advice treatment manages to elevate beliefs above 
the minimum threshold, which allows the sustenance of cooperative behaviour. 
Our results then have interpretable implications for all areas of research which 
focus on the resolution of social dilemmas and the creation of cooperative norms. 
These would include a gamut of subjects such as charitable giving, environmental 
protection, dispute resolution and others.   31
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Table 3: Round by round contributions in the three treatments 
   
Rounds  Treatment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
Progenitor  8.8 9.2 9.4 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.8 8.2  7  7.8 
Public 
Advice 
          
            
Generation 1  8.8 8.2 7.8 7.6 6.2 5.4 2.8  2  2.6 0.2 
Generation 2  9.4 9.2  9  8.8 7.2 6.2 3.8 7.6  7  2.4 
Generation 3  9.2 9.6 9.2 9.4 9.2 9.2 8.6 8.2 6.4 6.2 
Generation 4  9.8  9.8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Generation 5  10  10  10 8 10 8  9  8 6.8  10 
Generation 6  10 9.8 9.2 8.6 8.2 9.4 9.4  9  8  7.8 
            
AVERAGE 9.53 9.43  9.2  8.73 8.47 8.03 7.27 7.47  6.8  6.1 
Private 
Advice 
          
            
Generation 1  7.6 6.8 5.6 5.2 4.6  5  4.6 4.2 3.8  5 
Generation 2  7.8 7.6  7  5.8 4.2 2.8 2.6  3  1.8 0.8 
Generation 3  7 7.2  7.6  6.4 6 4.8  5.8  6.4 5 2.2 
Generation 4  8  8.6  8  7.8 7.2 4.8 4.2 2.8 3.6 4.2 
Generation 5  6.8 6.8 5.2 5.2 4.8  5  3.2 3.6  3  1.6 
            
AVERAGE 7.44  7.4  6.68 6.08 5.36 4.48 4.08  4  3.44 2.76 
No Advice            
            
Group 1  3.2  4.2 4 1.8 2 2.8 3 2.2  2.6 2 
Group 2  5.8 4.8 4.4 5.4 3.2 4.6 4.8 3.6  4  3.4 
Group 3  4.2 7.2 4.4 3.4 2.8 4.2  3  2.8 2.2 1.8 
Group 4  6.4  8.6  7.4 8 6.8 7 7.2 7 4.6 7 
Group 5  4.6 5.8 5.4 5.6 4.6 4.2 3.6 1.4 2.6 4.6 
            
AVERAGE  4.84  6.1 5.1 4.8 3.9 4.6 4.3 3.4 3.2 3.8   37
 
Table 4: Random Effects Tobit Regression of Contribution Made  









0.1407 0.0488  -1.2864*  -0.4516  Private Advice 
(0.6016) (0.4630) (0.7711) (0.9540) 
3.7831*** 3.5011*** 3.3894***  2.2837**  Public Advice 
(0.7354) (0.6253) (0.8364) (0.9191) 
  4.5798*** 8.9905*** 5.8916***  1/t 
  (0.4377) (1.0467) (1.1454) 
   0.3620***  0.7614***  ,1 it C −  
   (0.0616)  (0.0952) 
    0.5724***  ,1 it − Λ  
    (0.1084) 
6.1874*** 4.9647***  1.3729**  -0.0115  Constant 
(0.4570) (0.3641) (0.6994) (0.7889) 
Log Likelihood  -1689.7898  -1646.0099 -1448.4998 -1435.2628 
Wald 
2 χ   33.46***  145.59*** 289.35*** 275.24*** 
3.1968*** 2.9164*** 2.7577*** 2.7101***  ε σ  
(0.1082) (0.0977) (0.0989) (0.0981) 
2 χ  for  0 u σ =  328.86*** 379.33***  82.99***  76.48*** 
2 χ  Test for 
Equality of 
Treatment Effects
38.44*** 33.22*** 34.29*** 14.70*** 
Number of 
Observations 
850 850 765 765 
Number 
Uncensored 
542 542 491 491 
Number Lower 
Censored 
78 78 75 75 
Number Upper 
Censored 
230 230 199 199 
Number of 
players 
85 85 85 85 
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     38
 
Table 5: Determinants of Contribution Made: Sensitivity of Results to 
Estimation Method Used 













-0.4516 -5.0920***  -0.3706*  Private Advice 
(0.9540) (1.1842) (0.2049) 
2.2837** 3.8462***  0.0936  Public Advice 
(0.9191) (0.9075) (0.2412) 
5.8916*** 6.7987*** 2.0231***  1/t 
(1.1454) (1.1311) (0.7319) 
0.7614*** 0.6373*** 0.8871***  ,1 it C −  
(0.0952) (0.0943) (0.0449) 
0.5724*** 0.4756*** 0.3743***  ,1 it − Λ  
(0.1084) (0.1148) (0.0584) 
-0.0115 2.0604*** 0.0310  Constant 
(0.7889) (0.7847) (0.2592) 




2 χ   275.24*** 844.27***  1021.74*** 
2.7101***   2.0078  ε σ  
(0.0981)    
2 χ  for  0 u σ =  76.48***   8.23*** 
Joint Significance 
of the Player Fixed 
Effects 
 245.436***  
2 χ  Test for 
Equality of 
Treatment Effects 
14.70*** 63.42***  3.68* 
Number of 
Observations 
765 765 765 
Number 
Uncensored 
491 491   
Number Lower 
Censored 
75 75   
Number Upper 
Censored 
199 199   
Number of players  85    85 
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
P
#
P :For Fixed Effects Conditional Tobit  Regression this is a Likelihood Ratio Test 
P
$
P: Player Fixed Effects Included in the Set of Explanatory Variables   39
Table 6: Random Effects Tobit Regression by Session Type 

















3.2499 9.5895***  4.0972*** 3.9114  1/t 
(2.0135) (3.3139) (1.4669) (2.5370) 
0.9124*** 0.8178*** 0.9793*** 0.9082***  ,1 it C −  
(0.1520) (0.2234) (0.0865) (0.1943) 
0.2936* 1.0477***  0.2309**  0.4368*  ,1 it − Λ  
(0.1692) (0.2633) (0.1134) (0.2250) 
    1.8911  Public Advice 
    (1.9928) 
    2.3418  1/t ×Public 
Advice      (3.6280) 
    0.0669  ,1 it C − ×Public 
Advice      (0.2697) 
    0.6520**  ,1 it − Λ ×Public 
Advice      (0.3074) 
-0.8900 2.9082* -0.7755 -1.2690  Constant 
(0.6158) (1.6798) (0.5210) (1.0111) 
Log  Likelihood -464.0496 -391.6307 -553.0673 -882.7910 
Wald 
2 χ   139.98*** 56.75*** 230.16***  229.69 
2.3660*** 3.7618*** 2.7491*** 2.9056***  ε σ  
(0.1443) (0.2860) (01496) (0.1356) 
2 χ  for  0 u σ =  1.02 46.42***  2.20*  41.15*** 
Number of 
Observations 
225 270 270 495 
Number 
Uncensored 
183 108 200 291 
Number Lower 
Censored 
31 17 27 48 
Number Upper 
Censored 
11 145 43 156 
Number of 
players 
25 30 30 55 
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;  
P
$
P: Only for Private and Public Advice Sessions   40
Table 7: Effect of Deviation from Group Average on Change in Contribution 
() it C ∆  







B  in Private 
Advice 
Treatment 





B in Public 
Advice 
Treatment 





,1 it − Λ  denotes the deviation from group average in period  1 t −  
,1 0 it − Λ≥  implies that contribution was less than group average in period  1 t −  
,1 0 it − Λ<  implies that contribution was greater than group average in period  1 t −  41
 
Table 8: Does Ethnicity Matter? Random Effects Tobit Regression 




















Matter - No 
Advice 
-0.1763       Private Advice 
(0.8033)      
2.3118***       Public Advice 
(0.8286)      
5.9451*** 3.0842  1.5776 4.2518***  1/t 
(1.1995) (2.0355) (2.7287) (1.5309) 
0.7692*** 0.9192*** 1.5845*** 0.9892***  ,1 it C −  
(0.0967) (0.1518) (0.1769) (0.0908) 
0.5724*** 0.3206* 1.3737***  0.2467**  ,1 it − Λ  
(0.1060) (0.1688) (0.2289) (0.1219) 
0.1131 0.2184  0.9783***  0.0255  WHITE 
(0.1003) (0.1786) (0.3076) (0.0721) 
-0.6326 -1.5470*  -6.5426***  -0.9870  Constant 
(0.9088) (0.8566) (1.5042) (0.7931) 
Log  Likelihood  -1392.4344  -448.6751 -384.6432 -553.0096 
Wald 
2 χ   269.67*** 134.70*** 119.97*** 230.66*** 
2.6449*** 2.2933*** 3.9286*** 2.7478***  ε σ  
(0.0964) (0.1471) (0.3119) (0.1496) 
2 χ  for  0 u σ =  67.73*** 0.43  5.52**  2.20* 
Number of 
Observations 
738 216 252 270 
Number 
Uncensored 
483 177 106 200 
Number Lower 
Censored 
71 28 16 27 
Number Upper 
Censored 
184 11 130 43 
Number of 
players 
82 24 28 30 
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     42
  
Table 9: Random Effects Regression of Change in Contribution 










-0.3706*       Private Advice 
(0.2049)      
0.0936       Public Advice 
(0.2412)      
2.0231*** 2.5200**  3.2147*  1.0908  1/t 
(0.7319) (1.1350) (1.5647) (1.2681) 
-0.1129** -0.1450** -0.2362**  -0.0131  ,1 it C −  
(0.0449) (0.0620) (0.1168) (0.0801) 
0.3743*** 0.2151**  0.1634  0.7685***  ,1 it − Λ  
(0.0584) (0.0837) (0.1321) (0.1101) 
0.0310 0.0905 0.0759 -0.5063  Constant 
(0.2592) (0.3807) (0.4686) (0.6260) 
Wald 
2 χ   183.92*** 49.49***  46.21*** 112.54*** 
2 χ  for  0 u σ =  8.23*** 1.54  0.75  2.49 




3.68*      
Number of 
Observations 
765 270 225 270 
Number of 
players 
85 30 25 30 
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Appendix 1: Experimental Instructions 
 




This is an experiment in economic decision-making. Wellesley College has provided the 
funds conduct this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and make 
appropriate decisions, you may make an appreciable amount of money. This money will be 
paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  
 
You are in a market with 4 other people. The experiment will consist of 10 decision rounds. 
At the beginning of each round each participant will have an endowment of 10 tokens. In each 
round, each participant will choose how many tokens (ranging from 0 to 10) to allocate to a 
private account and how many tokens (ranging from 0 to 10) to allocate to a public account. 
For each round, these two numbers should add to 10, the total number of tokens you have for 
that round. At the beginning of each round you will write the number of tokens you wish to 
contribute to the public account on a slip of paper and hand it to the experimenter. The 
experimenter will then add up the total contributions to the public account and announce it 
publicly. The total number of tokens invested in the public account will be doubled and 
divided equally among all 5 participants. Your personal earnings for this round will equal the 
number of tokens you invested in your private account plus the number of tokens you get 
back from the public account (the latter may be a fractional amount). You will keep track of 
your contributions to each account and your earnings on the Record Sheet on the next page. 
Please take a look at the Record Sheet now.  
 
Each new round will proceed in the same way. Tokens invested in the private account in any 
round do not carry over to the next round. Every round you start with a fresh endowment of 
10 tokens. At the end of the experiment your total earnings from the 10 decision rounds will 
be added up and converted into cash at the rate of 5 cents per token.  
 
Unless you are in the first group to participate in this experiment, when you start the 
experiment you will receive written advice on how to make your decisions from a single 
subject who participated in the experiment immediately prior to you. At the end of your 10 
decision rounds you will leave advice to a new subject on how to make decisions.  On top of 
what you make in this session of the experiment, you will receive an additional payment 
equal to 50% of the earnings of the subject to whom you give advice.  Please write your 
advice on the sheet provided, and write or print legibly.  You will be notified by email or 
telephone when your second payment is ready. 
 
If you have any questions, please ask them now.    48
 
Subject ID (Student ID #)____________________ 
 
Please answer the following question after the instructions have been read and 
before the first round begins. 
 
What is the average contribution to the public account that you expect from the other 
subjects in your group? Do not include yourself, and round to the nearest integer if 
necessary. Please choose one: 
 
____ 0  ____ 3  ____ 6  ____ 9 
____ 1  ____ 4  ____ 7  ____ 10 

















(Add Cols. 2 
and 4) 
1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
8      
9      
10      
    TOTAL   
   49
 
 




What is your year? _________ 
 
What is your GPA? _________ 
 
What is your ethnic background? (Please choose one that you feel describes you best.) 
 
_____ African-American  _____ White (Caucasian, non-Hispanic) 
_____ Asian  _____ Other, specify: _______________ 







Please write your advice to the next player here. Continue on reverse if 
necessary.  
 
 
 
 
 